The article will argue that neither what may be called ‘multiple legitimacies’ nor what Leigh Jenco refers to as the hybrid view of legitimacy provides substantial guidance in reconceiving legitimacy in the increasingly pluralistic region of East Asia. Instead, a more helpful view of political legitimacy can be drawn from John Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy. I will demonstrate that Rawls’s classic formulation can be deprived of its liberal connotation by taking constitutional essentials as the source of legitimation for political authority. On the basis of this principle of pluralistic legitimacy, it will become clear that a pluralistic understanding of political legitimacy does not rule out Confucian meritocracy, but it does make a strong case for an antiperfectionist state, even if it might be nondemocratic.

中文翻译：

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儒家任人唯贤、政治合法性与宪政民主

本文将论证，无论是所谓的“多重合法性”还是 Leigh Jenco 所指的混合合法性观点，都无法为东亚日益多元化的地区重新构想合法性提供实质性指导。相反，可以从约翰·罗尔斯的自由主义合法性原则中得出对政治合法性更有帮助的观点。我将证明罗尔斯的经典表述可以通过将宪法要素作为政治权威合法化的来源而被剥夺其自由主义内涵。在多元合法性原则的基础上，对政治合法性的多元理解并不排除儒家任人唯贤，但它确实为反完美主义国家提供了强有力的理由，即使它可能是非民主的。