The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in India ushered in a new era of creditor-in-control regime with an in-built mechanism for time-bound resolution. This article examines the impact of the Code on firm borrowings and cost of funds. Using firm-level data on 4,531 firms for the period 2012–2018, we find that implementation of IBC has had many desirable consequences from a policy perspective. It helped in deleveraging of firms as their reliance on borrowings—whether long-term or short-term—declined. Further analysis suggests that this is especially true for weak and large firms. The stronger creditor protection is, thus, a step in the direction of reducing the burden on banks and further market deepening.

JEL Classification: G32, G33, G38, D22, O16

印度的《破产与破产法》（IBC）引入了内置的限时解决机制，开创了债权人控制制度的新纪元。本文研究了该准则对公司借款和资金成本的影响。使用2012-2018年间4,531家公司的公司级数据，我们发现，从政策角度来看，IBC的实施产生了许多可喜的后果。由于企业对借款的依赖（长期或短期）下降，这有助于减少企业的去杠杆化。进一步的分析表明，这对于弱企业和大企业而言尤其如此。因此，加强债权人保护是朝减轻银行负担和进一步深化市场迈出的一步。

JEL分类： G32，G33，G38，D22，O16