We examine vote delegation when delegators do not know the preferences of representatives. We show that free delegation favors minorities, that is, alternatives that have a lower chance of winning ex-ante. The same--but to a lesser degree--occurs if the number of voting rights actual voters can have is capped. However, when the fraction of delegators increases, the probability that the ex-ante minority wins under free and capped delegation converges to the one under conventional voting--albeit non-monotonically. Finally, when the total number of voters is converging to infinity with a fixed fraction of the majority, all three probabilities converge to one, no matter the number of delegators. Therefore, vote delegation is safe on a large scale.

中文翻译：

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投票代表团赞成少数派

当代表不知道代表的偏好时，我们将研究投票授权。我们表明，自由授权有利于少数群体，也就是说，其他方案在事前获得胜利的机会较小。如果实际选民可以拥有的投票权数量受到限制，则会发生相同的情况，但程度较小。但是，当代表所占的比例增加时，事前少数群体在自由和有上限的授权下获胜的可能性会收敛到传统投票下的少数派（尽管不是单调的）。最后，当选民总数汇聚成与广大的固定分数无穷大，这三种概率收敛到一个，无论是委托者的数量。因此，投票授权在很大程度上是安全的。