We empirically show that the auction IPO share price is the equilibrium outcome of a sequential game between promoters and institutional investors. In this game, promoters’ utility for information production and their utility for price stability are higher (lower) than their utility for IPO proceeds when they retain a large (small) fraction of the firm’s equity. Conversely, institutional investors always produce information and their utility for underpricing, which is inversely related to return volatility, is higher (lower) in lottery (pro-rata) IPOs. The findings provide new evidence on the economic roles of promoters and institutional investors in the auction IPO market.

我们实证表明，拍卖 IPO 股价是发起人与机构投资者之间连续博弈的均衡结果。在这个博弈中，当发起人保留大部分（小）公司股权时，发起人对信息生产的效用和对价格稳定的效用高于（低于）他们对 IPO 收益的效用。相反，机构投资者总是会产生信息，而他们的抑价效用与回报波动率成反比，在彩票（按比例）IPO 中更高（更低）。研究结果为发起人和机构投资者在拍卖 IPO 市场中的经济作用提供了新的证据。