The paper characterizes the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism for allocating a good to buyers who face asymmetric budget constraints. The optimal mechanism belongs to one of two classes. When the budget differences between the buyers are small, the mechanism discriminates only between high-valuation types for whom the budget constraint is binding. All low valuations buyers are treated symmetrically despite budget differences. When budget differences are sufficiently large, the mechanism discriminates in favor of buyers with small budgets when the valuations are low, and in favor of buyers with larger budgets when the valuations are high. We also provide a characterization of the constrained-efficient (surplus maximizing) mechanism and demonstrate that it shares the above properties of the optimal mechanism.

本文描述了一种最佳（收入最大化）机制，用于将商品分配给面临不对称预算约束的购买者。最佳机制属于两类之一。当购买者之间的预算差异较小时，该机制仅在预算约束具有约束力的高估值类型之间进行区分。尽管预算有所差异，但所有低估值买家都会得到对称对待。当预算差异足够大时，该机制会在价格低时区分有利于预算少的买方，而在价格高时则有利于预算大的买方。我们还提供了约束效率（盈余最大化）机制的特征，并证明了它具有最佳机制的上述特性。