How do exporting firms react to sanctions? Specifically, which firms are willing — or capable — to serve the market of a sanctioned country? We investigate this question for four sanctions episodes using monthly data on the universe of French exporting firms. We draw on recent econometric advances in the estimation of dynamic fixed effects binary choice models. We find that the introduction of new sanctions in Iran and Russia significantly lowered firm-level probabilities of serving these sanctioned markets, while the (temporary) lifting of the U.S. sanctions on Cuba and the removal of sanctions against Myanmar had no or only small trade-inducing effects, respectively. Additionally, the impact of sanctions is very heterogeneous along firm dimensions and by case particularities. Firms that depend more on trade finance instruments are more strongly affected, while prior experience in the sanctioned country considerably softens the blow of sanctions, and firms can be partly immune to the sanctions effect if they are specialized in serving “crisis countries”. Finally, we find suggestive evidence for sanctions avoidance by exporting indirectly via neighboring countries.

出口公司如何应对制裁？具体来说，哪些公司愿意或有能力为受制裁国家的市场服务？我们使用法国出口公司整体的月度数据对这个问题进行了四次制裁调查。在动态固定效应二元选择模型的估计中，我们借鉴了最新的计量经济学进展。我们发现，在伊朗和俄罗斯实施新的制裁措施，大大降低了为这些制裁市场服务的公司层面的可能性，而（暂时）取消美国对古巴的制裁和取消对缅甸的制裁则没有或只有很小的贸易，分别诱发效果。此外，制裁的影响在公司规模和案例特殊性上是非常不同的。更加依赖贸易融资工具的公司受到的影响更大，而受制裁国家的先前经验大大减轻了制裁的打击，如果公司专门为“危机国家”服务，则它们可以部分免受制裁的影响。最后，我们找到了通过邻国间接出口来避免制裁的暗示性证据。