Models of human-environment systems frequently employ the model of rational behaviour in which a rational, perfectly informed and self-interested homo oeconomicus maximises individual utility. This model has been criticised with regard to its adequacy in models of social-ecological systems, because other motives exist beyond profit maximisation that affect land-use decisions. The question arises what consequences do these other motives have on the design and performance of environmental policy instruments. For this, two existing generic models of agri-environmental schemes are expanded to consider alternative landowner behaviours: agents make mistakes in their search for the profit-maximising land-use decision, are inequity-averse and care about the profits of their neighbours, and are influenced by their neighbours' decisions. In the analyses even large deviations from the model of homo oeconomicus have generally only a small or moderate effect on the cost-effective design and the level of cost-effectiveness of the two agri-environmental schemes. With the models being rather simplistic, the results should not be used for specific policy advice but to point out and argue that the model of homo oeconomicus should not be abandoned prematurely, but its scope in environmental policy advice needs to be assessed more thoroughly both empirically and theoretically.

人类-环境系统模型经常采用理性行为模型，在这种模型中，理性的，完全知情的和自利的同等经济最大化个人效用。由于该模型在社会生态系统模型中的适用性而受到批评，因为除了利润最大化以外，还存在其他影响土地使用决策的动机。问题是这些其他动机会对环境政策工具的设计和性能产生什么影响。为此，扩展了两个现有的农业-环境计划通用模型，以考虑其他土地所有者的行为：代理商在寻求利润最大化的土地使用决策时犯了错误，厌恶不公平并关心邻居的利润，以及受邻居决定的影响。在分析中，甚至与经济均等模型存在较大偏差通常对两种农业环境计划的成本效益设计和成本效益水平仅产生很小或中等的影响。由于模型过于简单，因此不应将结果用于特定的政策建议，而应指出并辩称，不应过早放弃同质经济模型，但需要从经验上更全面地评估其在环境政策建议中的范围。和理论上。