As the competition among enterprises is increasingly fierce, the substitution of information assets makes the behavior of hackers and enterprises more complicated in the information security investment decision-making process. In this paper, a game model of substitutable enterprise information security investment decision making is constructed by considering the influencing of substitution rate among enterprises, enterprise quantity, and probability of hacker invasion, and the optimal investment level is analyzed among substitutable enterprises under individual decision and joint decision based on game theory, optimization theory, and synergy theory. This research provides a new solution of information security investment decision making among substitutable enterprises.

中文翻译：

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可替代企业信息安全投资决策的经济学分析

随着企业之间的竞争日益激烈，信息资产的替代使得黑客和企业在信息安全投资决策过程中的行为更加复杂。本文考虑企业间替代率、企业数量、黑客入侵概率等因素的影响,构建了可替代企业信息安全投资决策博弈模型,分析了个体决策和可替代企业间的最优投资水平。基于博弈论、优化理论和协同理论的联合决策。本研究为可替代企业的信息安全投资决策提供了新的解决方案。