Across the world, tax exemptions for jobs with low earnings intend to incite non-participating workers to rejoin the labor market. However, such tax exemptions may also have negative equilibrium effects. The German minijob tax exemption offers a convenient case to identify equilibrium effects as it applies to some but not to other low-wage jobs. We build and estimate a structural job search model with discontinuous taxes on German administrative data. Counterfactual policy simulations highlight distributional consequences of reforming the tax exemption. We find that 1.99 million individuals only participate in the labor market due to the tax exemption. A budget-neutral removal of the tax subsidy hurts these workers (e.g. retirees, students), but benefits those who seek small jobs independently of the tax exemption. Furthermore, a removal would result in greater variance in equilibrium wages, benefiting workers who search more (those without another job) at the cost of workers searching less (e.g. those seeking a second job).

在全球范围内，对低收入工作的免税旨在刺激不参与工作的工人重新加入劳动力市场。但是，这种免税也可能会产生负面的均衡影响。德国的迷你职位免税为确定均衡效应提供了一个方便的案例，因为它适用于某些低薪职位，但不适用于其他低薪职位。我们建立并估算了具有结构性的工作搜索模型，其中对德国行政数据使用了不连续的税收。反事实政策模拟强调了改革免税的分配结果。我们发现，由于免税，只有199万人参加了劳动力市场。与预算无关的取消税收补贴会伤害这些工人（例如退休人员，学生），但会使那些寻求独立于免税的小型工作的人受益。此外，