We study multi-lateral risk sharing when the state of nature is unverifiable, so that contracts are conditioned on a state-dependent signal (e.g., net earnings in a financial report). A subset of the agents can manipulate the signal’s realisation at some cost and, as a result, Pareto-optimal reallocation of risk is precluded. The agents can write additional side contracts that can be used to incentivise one of the parties to manipulate the signal. Using a novel stability notion that takes into account agents’ beliefs about contemporaneous deviations initiated by their counterparties, we explore the limits of risk sharing and risk bearing.

中文翻译：

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操纵多边合同

我们研究了当自然状态无法验证时的多边风险分担，因此合同以依赖于状态的信号（例如，财务报告中的净收益）为条件。代理的一个子集可以以一定的成本操纵信号的实现，因此，排除了帕累托最优的风险重新分配。代理可以编写额外的辅助合约，用于激励其中一方操纵信号。使用一种新的稳定性概念，该概念考虑了代理人对其交易对手发起的同时期偏差的信念，我们探索了风险分担和风险承担的限制。