The strength of sanctions can significantly impact the outcome of a dispute. The effectiveness of economic sanctions will be explored within the context of the conflict between Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and US shale oil producers in 2014. The outcome was not what OPEC anticipated, perhaps because OPEC misperceived the opponent’s preferences. Sensitivity to sanctions is a major component of a decision maker’s preferences when a dispute, or a negotiation, is modeled within the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). This study uses Inverse GMCR to determine what preference rankings would be required for the conflict to end as OPEC wished. The difference between the original preference ranking and the required rankings reflects the miscalculation of the strength of the economic “squeeze” that OPEC imposed when it flooded the market with oil to reduce the price. OPEC expected this sanction to be strong enough to damage, and perhaps destroy, the shale industry, but shale producers were able to withstand it. The graph model analysis suggests why this conflict ended as it did, and provides guidelines for understanding whether sanctions can be effective in forcing a particular outcome on a dispute.

中文翻译：

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评估经济制裁的有效性

制裁的力度会严重影响争端的结果。在2014年石油输出国组织（OPEC）与美国页岩油生产商之间发生冲突的背景下，将探讨经济制裁的有效性。结果并非OPEC预期的那样，可能是因为OPEC误解了对手的偏好。当在“冲突解决方案图模型”（GMCR）中建模争议或谈判时，对制裁的敏感性是决策者偏好的主要组成部分。这项研究使用反向GMCR来确定如欧佩克所希望的那样，要使冲突结束需要什么样的优先级。原始偏好等级与所需等级之间的差异反映了欧佩克在向市场注入石油以降低价格时施加的经济“挤压”强度的错误估算。欧佩克希望这项制裁足以破坏甚至破坏页岩产业，但页岩生产者能够承受。图形模型分析说明了为什么冲突会像以前那样结束，并提供了一些指导方针，以了解制裁是否可以有效地在争端上强制特定结果。