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Aggregation-Based Tag Deduplication for Cloud Storage with Resistance against Side Channel Attack
Security and Communication Networks Pub Date : 2021-02-16 , DOI: 10.1155/2021/6686281
Xin Tang 1 , Linna Zhou 2 , Bingwei Hu 1 , Haowen Wu 1
Affiliation  

Tag deduplication is an emerging technique to eliminate redundancy in cloud storage, which works by signing integrity tags with a content-associated key instead of user-associated secret key. To achieve public auditability in this scenario, the linkage between cloud users and their integrity tags is firstly re-established in current solutions, which provides a potential side channel to malicious third-party auditor to steal the existence privacy of a certain target file. Such kind of attack, which is also possible among classic public auditing schemes, still cannot be well resisted and is now becoming a big obstacle in using this technique. In this paper, we propose a secure aggregation-based tag deduplication scheme (ATDS), which takes the lead to consider resistance against side channel attack during the process of public verification. To deal with this problem, we define a user-associated integrity tag based on the defined content-associated polynomial and devise a Lagrangian interpolation-based aggregation strategy to achieve tag deduplication. With the help of this technique, content-associated public key is able to be utilized instead of a user-associated one to achieve auditing. Once the verification is passed, the TPA is just only able to make sure that the verified data are correctly corresponding to at least a group of users in cloud storage, rather than determining specific owners. The security analysis and experiment results show that the proposed scheme is able to resist side channel attack and is more efficient compared with the state of the art.

中文翻译:

基于聚合的标签重复数据删除技术可抵御侧边通道攻击

标签重复数据删除是一种消除云存储冗余的新兴技术,该技术通过使用与内容相关的密钥而不是与用户相关的秘密密钥对完整性标签进行签名来工作。为了在这种情况下实现公共审核,首先在当前解决方案中重新建立云用户及其完整性标签之间的链接,这为恶意的第三方审核员提供了窃取某个目标文件的存在隐私的潜在渠道。这种攻击(在经典的公共审计方案中也可能发生)仍然无法得到很好的抵抗,现在正成为使用此技术的一大障碍。在本文中,我们提出了一种基于安全聚合的标签重复数据删除方案(ATDS),该方案率先在公开验证过程中考虑了对旁路攻击的抵抗力。为了解决这个问题,我们基于定义的与内容相关的多项式定义了一个与用户相关的完整性标签,并设计了一个基于拉格朗日插值的聚合策略来实现标签重复数据删除。借助这种技术,可以利用与内容相关的公共密钥代替与用户相关的公共密钥来进行审核。一旦通过验证,TPA只能确定已验证的数据正确地对应于云存储中的至少一组用户,而不是确定特定所有者。安全分析和实验结果表明,与现有技术相比,该方案能够抵抗侧信道攻击,效率更高。我们基于定义的与内容相关的多项式定义了一个与用户相关的完整性标签,并设计了基于拉格朗日插值的聚合策略来实现标签重复数据删除。借助这种技术,可以利用与内容相关的公共密钥代替与用户相关的公共密钥来进行审核。一旦通过验证,TPA只能确定已验证的数据正确地对应于云存储中的至少一组用户,而不是确定特定所有者。安全分析和实验结果表明,与现有技术相比,该方案能够抵抗侧信道攻击,效率更高。我们基于定义的与内容相关的多项式定义了一个与用户相关的完整性标签,并设计了基于拉格朗日插值的聚合策略来实现标签重复数据删除。借助这种技术,可以利用与内容相关的公共密钥代替与用户相关的公共密钥来进行审核。一旦通过验证,TPA只能确定已验证的数据正确地对应于云存储中的至少一组用户,而不是确定特定所有者。安全分析和实验结果表明,与现有技术相比,该方案能够抵抗侧信道攻击,效率更高。可以利用与内容相关的公共密钥代替与用户相关的公共密钥来进行审核。一旦通过验证,TPA只能确定已验证的数据正确地对应于云存储中的至少一组用户,而不是确定特定所有者。安全分析和实验结果表明,与现有技术相比,该方案能够抵抗侧信道攻击,效率更高。可以使用与内容相关的公共密钥代替与用户相关的公共密钥来进行审核。一旦通过验证,TPA只能确定已验证的数据正确地对应于云存储中的至少一组用户,而不是确定特定所有者。安全分析和实验结果表明,与现有技术相比,该方案能够抵抗侧信道攻击,效率更高。
更新日期:2021-02-16
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