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How many women judges are enough on international courts?
Journal of Social Philosophy ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-15 , DOI: 10.1111/josp.12399
Andreas Follesdal 1, 2
Affiliation  

1 INTRODUCTION

The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) made history on August 27, 2018. The majority of its judges were female—six of 11, and the first among international courts and tribunals (ICs) to secure sex parity—that is, numerical equality.1 This achievement is even more remarkable given that only 23% of the judges and arbitrators of the ICs are women.2 The milestone also prompts us to consider more closely what considerations of legitimacy entail about the proportion of women international judges.

The present composition of ICs is clearly under legal, social, and political control, and ICs have profound effects. The persistent underrepresentation of women is especially striking since not only civil society groups, but also the states who nominate and establish election procedures have agreed several treaties that require or urge a balance of gender representation.3 So it would seem that the parity achieved by the ACtHPR should be applauded. However, that IC may now be even more gender equal than we may have reason to require of a legitimate IC—or so this article argues. A less egalitarian composition within a “parity zone” of approximately 40% of either of the main sexes seems to suffice.

The present reflections considers various possible arguments offered concerning the impact of gender inequality on the international bench, drawing in part on studies of domestic judiciaries, as well as on available research and reflections by practitioners and women international judges.4 Several arguments support calls to increase the proportion of female international judges—but how far? Section 2 addresses some background issues: first concerning the terms “feminism,” “sex,” and “gender,” then, the tasks of ICs that should lead us to question the present sex inequality on the international bench. The section finally identifies four levels of inequality found in the literature: a token of at least one member of either of the two prevalent sexes; a critical mass of 15–25%,5 a parity zone of at least 40% of each, or complete parity of sex representation as in the ACtHPR.

The next sections consider which of these levels can be supported by plausible arguments. The aim is not to test the empirical plausibility of these arguments, which often extrapolate findings about judicial behavior from domestic judiciaries in the United States. Alas, we have only pockets of empirical research on gender and ICs.6 So complete assessment of these arguments must wait. Section 3 explore arguments in favor of token representation and critical mass based on the substantive outputs of each IC, including both its judgments and interpretations. Section 4 considers arguments that lend further support to the need for a critical mass of either gender. The epistemic processes and workings of the IC must be fair and must be perceived to be so. The valuable effects on outcomes and procedures may often also be secured by “women sensitive” or feminist male judges.7 However, there are also argument that support a large proportion of both sexes. Section 5 considers arguments for a parity zone, based on arguments of compassion, the need for epistemic competence given intersectionality, and expressions of status equality. These arguments appear sound, but do not appear to support strict sex parity.8 Section 6 considers and rebuts some objections to the arguments in favor of a parity zone: that they “essentialize” gender, assume that elitist female international judges can “represent” all female gendered concerns, ignore the conflict between women's empathy and the need for impartiality,—or creates a slippery slope where ICs must “mirror” a myriad of characteristics of the affected populations.



中文翻译:

国际法庭上有多少女法官才够用?

1 简介

非洲人权和人民权利法院 (ACtHPR) 于 2018 年 8 月 27 日创造了历史。其大多数法官是女性——11 人中的 6 人,并且是国际法院和法庭 (IC) 中第一个确保性别平等的——也就是说, 数值相等。1鉴于 IC 中只有 23% 的法官和仲裁员是女性,这一成就更加显着。2这一里程碑还促使我们更仔细地考虑合法性对女性国际法官比例的影响。

IC 的当前组成显然处于法律、社会和政治控制之下,IC 具有深远的影响。女性的长期代表性不足尤其引人注目,因为不仅民间社会团体,而且提名和建立选举程序的州都同意了几项要求或敦促平衡性别代表性的条约。3因此,ACtHPR 实现的平等似乎应该受到称赞。然而,该 IC 现在可能比我们有理由要求的合法 IC 更加性别平等——或者本文认为。在大约 40% 的主要性别的“平等区域”内,不那么平等的组成似乎就足够了。

目前的思考考虑了关于性别不平等对国际法官的影响的各种可能的论点,部分借鉴了对国内司法机构的研究,以及从业者和女性国际法官的现有研究和思考。4有几个论点支持提高女性国际法官比例的呼吁——但能提高多少?第 2 节讨论了一些背景问题:首先是关于“女权主义”、“性”和“性别”的术语,然后是 IC 的任务,这些任务应该让我们在国际法庭上质疑当前的性别不平等。该部分最后确定了文献中发现的四个级别的不平等:两个普遍性别中至少有一个成员的象征;临界质量15–25%,5至少 40% 的均等区,或ACtHPR的性别代表完全均等。

接下来的部分将考虑这些水平中的哪些可以被合理的论据支持。目的不是为了检验这些论点的实证合理性,这些论点通常是从美国国内司法机构推断出关于司法行为的调查结果。唉,我们只有少数关于性别和 IC 的实证研究。6因此,对这些论点的完整评估必须等待。第 3 节根据每个 IC的实质性输出(包括其判断和解释)探讨支持代币表示临界质量的论点。第 4 节考虑了进一步支持需要临界质量的论点无论性别。IC 的认知过程和运作必须是公平的,并且必须被认为是公平的。对结果和程序的宝贵影响通常也可能由“女性敏感”或女权主义男性法官来确保。7然而,也有观点支持两性的很大比例。第 5 节考虑了平等区的论点,基于同情的论点、给定交叉性对认知能力的需求以及地位平等的表达。这些论点看似合理,但似乎不支持严格的性别平等8第 6 节考虑并反驳了对支持平等区论点的一些反对意见:他们“本质化”性别,假设精英女性国际法官可以“代表”所有女性性别问题,忽略女性同理心和公正需要之间的冲突, — 或创建一个滑坡,IC 必须“反映”受影响人群的无数特征。

更新日期:2021-02-15
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