We consider credence goods. A typical example of a credence good is an expert service. Experts often offer rebates contingent on their client's failure or bonus payments contingent on their client's success. This paper provides a different rationale for performance-based payments than reducing moral hazard. We show that a performance-based payment can be a signal of the seller's ability. Due to different success rates across expert abilities, a high-ability expert can commit to offering larger indemnity payments contingent on a client's failure or smaller bonus payments contingent on a client's success. Thus, high quality is signaled by performance-based pricing.

中文翻译：

---

基于绩效的付款：表明信用商品的质量

我们考虑信用商品。信用商品的典型示例是专家服务。专家通常根据客户的失败提供回扣或根据客户的成功提供奖金。本文为基于绩效的支付提供了与减少道德风险不同的理由。我们表明，基于绩效的付款可以是卖方能力的一个信号。由于不同专家能力的成功率不同，高能力专家可以承诺根据客户的失败提供更大的赔偿金或根据客户的成功提供较小的奖金。因此，基于性能的定价标志着高质量。