Abstract

In this paper, we solve the revenue maximization problem of a multi-product monopolist when the products are substitutes. We consider a Hotelling model with two horizontally differentiated goods located at the endpoints of the segment. Consumers are located uniformly on the segment; their valuations for each good are equal to the base consumption value minus distance costs. When the base consumption value is high, the seller maximizes her expected profit by offering a menu of base and opaque goods. In particular, a single half-half lottery over base goods is optimal under concave and linear costs. When base consumption value is low, only base goods are sold. Finally, when base consumption value is intermediate, the optimal mechanism may entail the offering of lotteries with the positive probability of no delivery. Our findings can explain the emergence of opaque goods sales (e.g., hotel bookings without a complete description of the hotel through hotwire.com or priceline.com) as the outcome of the industry’s search for the optimal selling scheme.

中文翻译：

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惊喜市场：通过彩票销售替代商品

摘要

在本文中，我们解决了产品替代时多产品垄断者的收益最大化问题。我们考虑一个在分部的端点具有两个水平区分商品的霍特林模型。消费者在细分市场上的位置一致；他们对每种商品的估值等于基本消费价值减去距离成本。当基本消费价值很高时，卖方通过提供基本商品和不透明商品菜单来最大化其预期利润。尤其是，在凹面和线性成本下，基础产品上的半个彩票是最佳选择。当基本消费价值低时，仅出售基本商品。最后，当基本消费值处于中间水平时，最佳机制可能需要提供具有不交付正可能性的彩票。