Several countries extend collective bargaining agreements to entire sectors, therefore binding non-subscriber workers and employers. These extensions may address coordination issues but may also distort competition by imposing sector-specifc minimum wages and other work conditions that are not appropriate for many firms. In this paper, we analyse the impact of such extensions along several margins drawing on firm-level monthly data for Portugal, a country where extensions have been widespread until recently. Drawing on the scattered timing of the extensions, we find that both formal employment and wage bills in the relevant sector fall, on average, by 2% - and by 25% more across small firms - over the four months after an extension is issued. These results are driven by both reduced hirings and increased firm closures. On the other hand, informal work, not subject to labour law or extensions, tends to increase. Our findings are robust to several checks, including a falsification exercise based on extensions that were announced but not implemented. JEL codes: J52, K31, J23

中文翻译：

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30,000 最低工资：集体谈判扩展的经济影响

一些国家将集体谈判协议扩展到整个部门，因此对非订户工人和雇主具有约束力。这些延期可能解决协调问题，但也可能通过强加特定行业的最低工资和其他不适合许多公司的工作条件来扭曲竞争。在本文中，我们利用葡萄牙的公司层面月度数据分析了此类延期的影响，该国直到最近才广泛使用延期。利用延期的分散时间，我们发现，在延期发布后的四个月内，相关部门的正式就业和工资支出平均下降 2%，小企业下降 25%。这些结果是由招聘减少和公司关闭增加共同推动的。另一方面，不受劳动法或延期约束的非正式工作往往会增加。我们的调查结果对多项检查都是稳健的，包括基于已宣布但未实施的扩展的伪造练习。JEL 代码：J52、K31、J23