Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether top management will assume their liabilities especially when financial restatement occurs, and,based on the “effective supervision theory” and “strategic cooperation theory,” to examine whether an institutional investor is a supervisor or a cooperator considering the management turnover caused by financial restatement in the companies. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of the A-share-listed companies from year 2010 to year 2014 and dividing financial restatement into fraudulent financial restatement and other financial restatement, the authors examine the relationship between financial restatement and abnormal management turnover, which usually is related to the management integrity or capacity. By using group test methods, the authors test the influence of the institutional investors’ shareholding on the relation between financial restatements and management turnover. Findings This paper finds that financial restatement can result in abnormal management turnover, especially the fraudulent financial restatement. The institutional investors usually are supervisors but when the shareholding of institutional investor is too high and the management turnover results from fraudulent financial restatement, the institutional investors may become cooperators with management in the companies. Besides, the institutional investors play the supervisory function more significantly in non-state-owned enterprises. Originality/value This paper expands literature of the institutional investors in the corporate governance area and provides a basis for future research in the area of the institutional investors’ governance effect. It divides financial restatements into fraudulent financial restatement and other financial restatement and examines the relationship between financial restatement and abnormal management turnover so as to provide evidence about whether the management will assume their responsibilities when there is financial restatement in the company. It also tests whether the institutional investors will play supervisor’s or cooperator’s function in state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.

中文翻译：

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机构投资者是主管还是合作者？基于财务重述与管理人员更替之间的关系

目的本文的目的是讨论高级管理人员是否将承担其责任，尤其是在发生财务重述时，并基于“有效监管理论”和“战略合作理论”，研究机构投资者是监管人还是监管人。合作者考虑公司财务重述导致的管理人员流失。设计/方法/方法使用2010年至2014年间A股上市公司的样本，将财务重编分为欺诈性财务重编和其他财务重编，作者研究了财务重编与异常营业额之间的关系。与管理的完整性或能力有关。通过使用小组测试方法，作者检验了机构投资者的股权对财务重述与管理人员流动之间关系的影响。结论本文发现，财务重编会导致管理人员更替异常，尤其是欺诈性的财务重编。机构投资者通常是监事，但是当机构投资者的股份过高并且由于欺诈性的财务重述导致管理人员流失时，机构投资者可能会成为公司管理层的合作者。此外，机构投资者在非国有企业中的监督作用更为显着。原创性/价值本文扩展了公司治理领域机构投资者的文献，并为机构投资者治理效果领域的未来研究提供了基础。它将财务重述分为欺诈性财务重述和其他财务重述，并检查财务重述与管理层异常营业额之间的关系，以提供证据说明管理层在公司进行财务重述时是否将承担其责任。它还测试了机构投资者是否将在国有企业和非国有企业中发挥监督或合作者的作用。它将财务重述分为欺诈性财务重述和其他财务重述，并检查财务重述与管理层异常营业额之间的关系，以提供证据说明管理层在公司进行财务重述时是否将承担其责任。它还测试了机构投资者是否将在国有企业和非国有企业中发挥监督或合作者的作用。它将财务重述分为欺诈性财务重述和其他财务重述，并检查财务重述与管理层异常营业额之间的关系，以提供证据说明管理层在公司进行财务重述时是否将承担其责任。它还测试了机构投资者是否将在国有企业和非国有企业中发挥监督或合作者的作用。