Abstract

This discussion examines how security and counterintelligence vetting practices vary across domains and how this informs our understanding of counterintelligence disciplines. Organizations in each domain must ensure that persons admitted as insiders can be trusted with sensitive information and the organization’s security. We look at some examples of counterintelligence vetting, seeking commonalities in vetting needs and practices between armed groups, corporations, and states. We compare, in depth, the vetting practices of Lebanese Hezbollah, the reconstituted Syrian intelligence services, the drug-trafficking group known as Los Zetas, and High-Value Technology Companies (HVTCs). The evident regularities and commonalities in counterintelligence vetting suggest cross-domain and cross-cultural targets for exploitation.

摘要

本次讨论探讨了安全和反间谍审查实践如何在不同领域有所不同，以及这如何影响我们对反间谍学科的理解。每个域中的组织都必须确保被承认为内部人员的人员可以信任敏感信息和组织的安全性。我们看一些反间谍审查的例子，寻找武装团体、公司和国家之间审查需求和做法的共同点。我们深入比较了黎巴嫩真主党、重组后的叙利亚情报机构、名为 Los Zetas 的贩毒集团和高价值技术公司 (HVTC) 的审查做法。反间谍审查中明显的规律性和共性表明了跨领域和跨文化的剥削目标。