We empirically test early monetary theories in which reserve creation plays a crucial role in the transmission of quantitative easing (QE). Analyzing the unprecedented injection of reserves across several Federal Reserve QE programs, we demonstrate a causal effect of bank‐level reserve accumulation on lending and risk‐taking activity. To overcome the endogeneity of bank‐level reserve increases to banks' other portfolio decisions, we employ instruments made available by a regulatory change that strongly influenced the distribution of reserves in the banking system. Consistent with the theory, we document that reserve creation leads to higher total loan growth and increased risk taking.

中文翻译：

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量化宽松和银行风险承担：来自贷款的证据

我们对早期的货币理论进行经验检验，在这些理论中，储备创造在量化宽松政策（QE）的传递中起着至关重要的作用。通过分析美联储几个量化宽松计划中前所未有的储备金注入，我们证明了银行级储备金积累对借贷和冒险活动的因果关系。为了克服银行级准备金增加对银行其他投资组合决策的内生性，我们采用了因监管变化而可用的工具，这些变化强烈影响了银行系统中储备的分配。与该理论一致，我们证明了准备金的增加会导致更高的总贷款增长和更大的冒险精神。