We investigate the effect of competition in the nursing‐homes sector with a two‐sided market approach. Using a Hotelling model, our key findings are that (i) the two‐sidedness of the market leads to higher wages for nurses, (ii) this is then passed to residents in the form of higher prices, and (iii) nursing‐homes profits are instead unaffected. In contrast, when nurses wages are regulated, the two‐sidedness of the market implies a transfer between residents and nursing homes. When residents' price is regulated, it implies a transfer between nurses and nursing homes. These key results are generally robust to institutional settings which employ pay‐for‐performance schemes, the presence of altruistic motives of nursing homes and the heterogeneity in residents reservation utility.

中文翻译：

---

市场两面化时的疗养院竞争和分配影响

我们采用双面市场方法研究了养老院领域竞争的影响。使用Hotelling模型，我们的主要发现是：（i）市场的两面性导致护士的工资更高；（ii）然后以更高的价格形式传递给居民；（iii）养老院利润反而不会受到影响。相反，当对护士的工资进行监管时，市场的两面性意味着居民与养老院之间的转移。当居民价格受到管制时，就意味着护士与疗养院之间的转移。这些关键结果通常对采用按绩效付费计划的机构环境，养老院的利他动机以及居民预订效用的异质性具有稳健性。