This study examines taxpayer compliance in the presence and absence of collusively corrupt tax auditors and compares it to taxpayer compliance in the presence and absence of coercively corrupt tax auditors. Our experimental results show that overall taxpayer compliance declines in the presence of a collusively corrupt tax auditor who accepts bribes that leave the taxpayer economically better off. In contrast, taxpayer compliance increases in the presence of coercive tax auditors who demand moderate bribes. This may reflect taxpayers’ attempt to create a moral distance between themselves and the corrupt auditor. However, such economic sacrifices disappear when the level of bribe demanded by coercive auditors is increased to a higher component of reported income, suggesting that taxpayers may be willing to bear only relatively modest costs to morally differentiate themselves from coercive tax auditors.

这项研究检查了在存在和不存在合谋腐败的审计师的情况下的纳税人合规性，并将其与在存在和不存在强制性腐败审计师的情况下的纳税人合规性进行了比较。我们的实验结果表明，在存在合谋腐败的税务审计师的情况下，整体纳税人合规性下降，而该审计师接受贿赂会使纳税人在经济上更富裕。相反，在强制要求中度贿赂的强制性税务审计员在场的情况下，纳税人的合规性有所提高。这可能反映出纳税人试图在自己和腐败的审计师之间建立道德上的距离。但是，当强制审核员要求的贿赂水平增加到所报告收入的较高部分时，这种经济牺牲就消失了，