Why do some leaders devote significant funds to research and development (R&D) even though such investments are risky, less visible to the public than many other investments, and typically bear fruit only after the incumbent has already left office? This paper suggests that investing in R&D improves the incumbent's perceived competence among voters. Using a formal model of signaling, survey experiments conducted in the US and Russia, and corroborating cross-country evidence, I demonstrate that investment in R&D improves perceptions of incumbent competence and approval of the government among the citizenry.

中文翻译：

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令人费解的研发政治：通过风险项目传达能力

为什么一些领导人将大量资金投入到研发 (R&D) 上，尽管此类投资具有风险，与许多其他投资相比对公众不那么明显，而且通常只有在现任者卸任后才能取得成果？本文表明，对研发的投资提高了在职者在选民中的感知能力。使用正式的信号模型、在美国和俄罗斯进行的调查实验以及确证的跨国证据，我证明了对研发的投资提高了公民对政府在职能力和认可度的看法。