We analyse an oligopoly model where mobile operators may charge subscribers for placing and receiving calls. We compare the CPP equilibrium (where receiving calls is free) with the RPP equilibrium (where placing and receiving calls are priced equally). Reducing termination rates leads to lower prices and higher penetration under CPP, but has reversed effects under RPP. No termination rate yields efficiency under either retail regime. Comparing EU practice (CPP with termination regulated at cost) and US practice (RPP with Bill and Keep), we find that total surplus is higher in the US when the value of receiving calls is very high, but both producer and consumer surplus are higher in the EU for intermediate values of the call externality. If call externality is higher (resp., lower), consumers (resp., producers) are better off in the US.

我们分析了一种寡头垄断模型，其中移动运营商可能会向用户收取拨打和接听电话的费用。我们将 CPP 均衡（接听电话免费）与 RPP 均衡（拨打和接听电话的价格相同）进行比较。降低终止率会导致 CPP 下的价格降低和渗透率提高，但在 RPP 下会产生相反的效果。在这两种零售制度下，没有终止率会产生效率。比较欧盟的做法（CPP 与终止按成本监管）和美国的做法（RPP with Bill and Keep），我们发现当接听电话的价值非常高时，美国的总剩余较高，但生产者和对于呼叫外部性的中间值，欧盟的消费者剩余更高。如果呼叫外部性更高（相应地，更低），则美国的消费者（相应地，生产者）的状况会更好。