We study the welfare effects of a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform in a federation. The reform consists of increasing a tax on a polluting input and reducing that on labor income. Households are fully mobile within the federation. Regions are unequally endowed with a nonrenewable natural resource. Resource rents are owned by regions and are redistributed to citizens on a residence basis, which generates a motive for inefficiently relocating to the resource-rich jurisdiction. Since the resource-poor region has a higher marginal product of labor than does the resource-rich region in equilibrium, the tax reform mitigates the scope of inefficient migration if labor and the natural resource are complements, but exacerbates it if they are substitutes. This welfare effect may significantly affect fiscal costs of pollution pricing and calls for an adjusted environmental tax, higher when inputs are complements, lower when they are substitutes, as compared with a model where migration is assumed away.

我们研究了联邦中不影响收入的环境税改革的福利影响。改革包括增加对污染性投入的税收并减少对劳动收入的税收。家庭在联盟内部完全可以流动。地区被赋予了不可再生的自然资源。资源租金归各地区所有，并按居住地重新分配给公民，这为低效地迁移到资源丰富的辖区提供了动力。由于资源贫乏地区的劳动边际产出高于均衡状态下资源富裕地区的劳动边际，因此，如果劳动力和自然资源是互补的，那么税制改革会减轻低效率移民的范围，但如果他们替代劳动力和自然资源，则会加剧这种情况。