We document the emergence of the Lead Independent Director (LID) board role in a sample of U.S. firms from 1999–2015. We find that firms that adopt an LID board role are larger and have more independent boards, higher institutional investor holdings, and an NYSE listing. Firms with greater anticipated benefits from monitoring also adopt an LID role, e.g., firms with dual CEO-Chairman, with more takeover defense mechanisms, and with higher cash holdings. Using an event study methodology, we find that investors respond positively to the adoption of an LID board role. Lastly, using instrumental variables to address endogeneity in the LID board role, we find that firms with an LID are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that the LID board role enhances firm value and improves the quality of corporate governance.

我们记录了1999-2015年间美国公司样本中首席独立董事（LID）董事职位的出现。我们发现，采用LID董事会角色的公司规模更大，拥有更多的独立董事会，更高的机构投资者持股以及在纽约证券交易所上市。从监控中获得更大预期收益的公司也将扮演LID角色，例如，具有首席执行官兼董事长的公司，具有更多的收购防御机制以及拥有更多现金的公司。使用事件研究方法，我们发现投资者对采用LID董事会角色做出了积极回应。最后，使用工具变量来解决LID董事会角色的内生性，我们发现拥有LID的公司更有可能终止表现不佳的CEO。整体来看