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Determinants and Consequences of Executive Compensation-Related Shareholder Activism and Say-on-Pay Votes: A Literature Review and Research Agenda
Journal of Accounting Literature ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2018-06-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.acclit.2018.02.001
Jörn Obermann , Patrick Velte

Abstract This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

中文翻译:

与高管薪酬相关的股东积极性和“有偿说”投票的决定因素和后果:文献综述和研究议程

摘要这篇系统的文献综述分析了与高管薪酬相关的股东激进主义和“有酬说”(SOP)投票的决定因素和后果。这篇综述涵盖了1995年1月至2017年9月之间发表的71篇经验文章。这些研究是在一个实证研究框架内进行回顾的,该框架一方面将股东积极主义和SOP投票异议的原因一方面作为输入因素,另一方面将股东压力的后果作为输出因素在另一。该程序确定了文献中五个最重要的因素组:高管薪酬的水平和结构,公司特征,公司治理机制,股东结构和利益相关者。其中,高管薪酬和公司特征是最经常检查的。进一步的研究表明,对于经理人和股东而言,新古典委托代理理论的关键假设并不总是与最近的经验证据相一致。首先,行为方面(例如对公平的感知)影响补偿行动主义和SOP投票。其次,非金融利益大大缓和了股东的积极性。就此而言,我们建议将行为和非财务方面纳入现有研究。分析了其含义,并通过提出19个不同的研究问题讨论了进一步研究的新方向。行为方面(例如对公平的感知)会影响补偿行动主义和SOP投票。其次,非金融利益大大缓和了股东的积极性。就此而言,我们建议将行为和非财务方面纳入现有研究。分析了其含义,并通过提出19个不同的研究问题讨论了进一步研究的新方向。行为方面(例如对公平的感知)会影响补偿行动主义和SOP投票。其次,非金融利益大大缓和了股东的积极性。就此而言,我们建议将行为和非财务方面纳入现有研究。分析了其含义,并通过提出19个不同的研究问题讨论了进一步研究的新方向。
更新日期:2018-06-01
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