This paper argues that evidential decision theory (EDT) is incompatible with options having objective values. After some scene-setting (§§1-3), we consider three arguments for our thesis: the argument from Newcomb’s Problem (§§4-5), the argument from Expectationism (§§6-7), and the argument from Newcombizability (§8). The first two arguments fail for instructive reasons. But the third succeeds. EDT is incompatible with options having objective values because objective value is always Newcombizable. What to make of this incompatibility is a matter on which the authors disagree. One is inclined to take it to be a reason for rejecting the claim that options have objective values; the other is inclined to take it to be a reason for rejecting EDT. The paper, itself, takes no stand on this downstream disagreement; it merely argues for the incompatibility.

中文翻译：

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客观价值总是新的

本文认为证据决策理论（EDT）与具有客观价值的选项不相容。在一些场景设置（§§1-3）之后，我们为我们的论文考虑三个论证：来自纽科姆问题的论证（§§4-5），来自期望主义的论证（§§6-7），以及来自Newcombizability (§8)。前两个论点由于有启发性的原因而失败。但是第三次​​成功了。EDT 与具有客观价值的期权不兼容，因为客观价值总是新可组合的。如何解释这种不兼容性是作者们不同意的问题。人们倾向于将其作为拒绝期权具有客观价值这一主张的理由；另一个倾向于将其作为拒绝 EDT 的理由。这篇论文本身对这种下游分歧不持立场。