It is easy to talk about what we know right now, what we knew yesterday and what we will come to know tomorrow. We can also talk about what might be now and what might have been the case yesterday. But what about what might be tomorrow? I argue that we can indeed talk coherently about future epistemic possibilities, but not as we might have expected. In cases where information is lost, they cannot simply be used to talk about our future evidence. In light of this, I argue we need a new theory of the domains of quantification for epistemic modals. Epistemic modals are often thought of as tools for describing a given body of evidence. Specifically, a sentence like

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未来“可能”带来什么

谈论我们现在知道的、昨天知道的和明天将要知道的很容易。我们还可以讨论现在可能发生的情况以及昨天可能发生的情况。但是明天可能会怎样呢？我认为我们确实可以连贯地谈论未来的认知可能性，但不是我们所期望的。在信息丢失的情况下，它们不能简单地用于谈论我们未来的证据。有鉴于此，我认为我们需要一种关于认知模态量化领域的新理论。认知模态通常被认为是描述给定证据体的工具。具体来说，像这样的句子