In a recent article, Hofweber (2019) presents a new, and surprising, argument for idealism. His argument is surprising because it starts with an apparently innocent premiss from the philosophy of language: that ‘that’-clauses do not refer. I do not think that Hofweber's argument works, and my first aim in this paper is to explain why. However, I agree with Hofweber that what we say about ‘that’-clauses has important metaphysical consequences. My second aim is to argue that, far from leading us into idealism, denying that ‘that’-clauses refer is the first step toward a kind of direct realism about belief.

中文翻译：

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唯心主义与真理同一论

在最近的一篇文章中， Hofweber (2019) 提出了一个新的、令人惊讶的理想主义论点。他的论点令人惊讶，因为它始于语言哲学中一个明显无辜的前提：“that”子句不指称。我认为 Hofweber 的论点行不通，我在本文中的第一个目的是解释原因。然而，我同意 Hofweber 的观点，即我们所说的“那个”子句具有重要的形而上学后果。我的第二个目的是论证，远非将我们引向唯心主义，否认“that”子句所指的是迈向一种关于信念的直接现实主义的第一步。