Epistemologists have recently noted a tension between (i) denying access internalism and (ii) maintaining that rational agents cannot be epistemically akratic, believing claims akin to ‘P, but I shouldn’t believe P’. I bring out the tension, and develop a new way to resolve it. The basic strategy is to say that access internalism is false, but that counterexamples to it are ‘elusive’ in a way that prevents rational agents from suspecting that they themselves are counterexamples to the internalist principles. I argue that this allows us to do justice to the motivations behind both (i) and (ii). And I explain in some detail what a view of evidence that implements this strategy, and makes it independently plausible, might look like.

中文翻译：

---

难以捉摸的外在主义

认识论学家最近注意到 (i) 拒绝访问内在主义和 (ii) 坚持理性的代理人不能在认识上是不正常的，相信类似于“P，但我不应该相信 P”的主张之间存在紧张关系。我带出了紧张，并开发了一种新的方法来解决它。基本策略是说访问内在主义是错误的，但它的反例是“难以捉摸的”，以防止理性代理人怀疑他们自己是内在主义原则的反例。我认为这使我们能够公正地处理 (i) 和 (ii) 背后的动机。我详细解释了实施该策略并使其独立合理的证据视图可能是什么样子。