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Against Person Essentialism
Mind ( IF 1.8 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-29 , DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa016
Eric T Olson* , Karsten Witt 1
Affiliation  

It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with dementia.

中文翻译:

反对个人本质主义

人们普遍认为,每个人本质上都是一个人,作为一个人具有特殊的心理属性,例如智力和自我意识。因此,没有任何东西可以获得或失去这些属性。该论文认为,随着时间的推移,这排除了所有熟悉的关于个人身份的心理连续性观点。它还面临着解释不聪明和没有自我意识的人类(例如胎儿和痴呆症患者)的智力方面的严重困难。
更新日期:2020-06-29
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