Satisficing consequentialism is an unpopular theory. Because it permits gratuitous sub-optimal behaviour, it strikes many as wildly implausible. It has been widely rejected as a tenable moral theory for more than twenty years. In this article, I rehearse the arguments behind this unpopularity, before examining an attempt to redeem satisficing. Richard Yetter Chappell has recently defended a form of ‘effort satisficing consequentialism’. By incorporating an ‘effort ceiling’ – a limit on the amount of willpower a situation requires – and requiring that agents produce at least as much good as they could given how much effort they are exerting, Chappell avoids the obvious objections. However, I demonstrate that the revised theory is susceptible to a different objection, and that the resulting view requires that any supererogatory behaviour must be efficient, which fails to match typical moral verdicts.

中文翻译：

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满足结果主义仍然不能满足

满足结果论是一个不受欢迎的理论。因为它允许无端的次优行为，所以它让许多人感到难以置信。二十多年来，它作为一种站得住脚的道德理论被广泛拒绝。在这篇文章中，我排练了这种不受欢迎背后的论点，然后再研究一种挽回满足感的尝试。Richard Yetter Chappell 最近为一种“努力满足结果主义”进行了辩护。通过引入“努力上限”——一种情况所需意志力的限制——并要求代理人在付出多少努力的情况下至少能产生尽可能多的好处，Chappell 避免了明显的反对意见。然而，我证明修改后的理论容易受到不同的反对，