R. M. Hare has an ambitious project of arguing from a limited set of premises about the nature of moral thought and language all the way to substantive utilitarian conclusions. I reconstruct Hare's argument, identify an important problem for Hare, and then develop and endorse a restricted Hare-like argument. This argument is less ambitious than Hare's, and does not substantiate utilitarian conclusions on its own, but I demonstrate that it nonetheless imposes important constraints on moral judgements and I indicate how it can play a role in a larger argument for utilitarian conclusions.

中文翻译：

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重新思考黑尔对道德思维的分析

RM Hare 有一个雄心勃勃的项目，从关于道德思想和语言本质的有限前提一直争论到实质性的功利主义结论。我重构了 Hare 的论证，确定了 Hare 的一个重要问题，然后发展并认可了一个受限的 Hare 式论证。这个论点没有黑尔的雄心勃勃，并且本身并不能证实功利主义的结论，但我证明它仍然对道德判断施加了重要的限制，并且我指出它如何在更大的功利主义结论论点中发挥作用。