Organised crime saw swift ascent as a security priority for the international community after the end of the Cold War. High political excitement surrounded the subject of organised crime, accompanied by an apparently bottomless demand for calculations of its magnitude and attendant risks. Over ensuing decades, concerns were repeatedly raised about the limitations afflicting pertinent cross-national data and related analysis. To date, debates about the stubbornly weak empirical underpinnings of UN and EU efforts to combat organised crime have tended to attribute the ultimate source of such limitations to either issues of capacity (political or technical) or bureaucratic self-interest, thereby portraying states essentially as either inadequate or insignificant actors. Drawing on insights from scholarship on the rise of the security state and the political exploitation of policy against organised crime, this paper suggests that the role of states in producing and sustaining the weaknesses of such policy may have been unduly discounted.

中文翻译：

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无能力、病理或权宜之计？重新审视支持打击有组织犯罪的国际努力的数据和分析弱点

冷战结束后，有组织犯罪迅速上升为国际社会的安全优先事项。有组织犯罪这一主题引起了高度的政治兴奋，同时伴随着对其规模和随之而来的风险进行计算的需求显然是无底的。在随后的几十年里，人们一再担心影响相关跨国数据和相关分析的局限性。迄今为止，关于联合国和欧盟打击有组织犯罪的努力的顽固薄弱的经验基础的辩论倾向于将这种限制的最终根源归咎于能力问题（政治或技术）或官僚的自身利益，从而将国家本质上描述为不适当或不重要的演员。