The article analyzes the concept of universality in Oleg Drobnitskii’s ethics. As opposed to most Soviet ethicists of the 1960s and early 1970s, Drobnitskii viewed this concept along the lines of the principle of universality presented in the moral theories of Immanuel Kant and Richard Hare. However, while they considered universality to be a feature of individual moral thinking in the forms of maxims, principles, and evaluations, Drobnitskii understood universality as the main feature of moral requirements and essentially external to the moral agent, representing to her social relations and the ‘general laws of history.’ It was conceptually significant in Drobnitskii’s approach to universality that he analyzed it within the context of a more general concept of morality—as a mode of normative regulation of behavior. In this capacity, universality was presented as a characteristic of general appeal, or the general way in which a moral requirement is binding. The principle of equality is a normative correlate of universality understood in this way. Universality also characterizes judgments, whose moral adequacy is verified through the procedure of universalization. Regarding universality, Drobnitskii discussed important questions of the individualization of the universal moral requirement in the form of the moral agent’s personal task and the universality of class moral views. He tried to explain these differing, and not always interconnected, aspects of universality by appealing to certain ‘general laws of history,’ and thus offered a historicist basis of morality. This article shows that, despite this unprecedented (for Soviet ethical literature) analysis of the issue of universality, Drobnitskii did not achieve a systematic conclusion in his conceptualization of universality. Nevertheless, he was able to offer a number of significant insights, with the potential to aid our further comprehension of the phenomenon of universality and how it ought to be understood.

中文翻译：

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奥列格·德罗布尼茨基道德哲学中的普遍性概念

文章分析了奥列格·德罗布尼茨基伦理学中的普遍性概念。与 1960 年代和 1970 年代初期的大多数苏联伦理学家不同，德罗布尼茨基根据伊曼纽尔·康德和理查德·黑尔的道德理论中提出的普遍性原则来看待这一概念。然而，虽然他们认为普遍性是格言、原则和评价形式的个人道德思维的一个特征，但德罗布尼茨基将普遍性理解为道德要求的主要特征，并且本质上是在道德主体之外的，代表她的社会关系和“历史的一般规律。” 德罗布尼茨基的普遍性方法在概念上具有重要意义，他在更普遍的道德概念的背景下对其进行了分析——作为一种规范行为的规范模式。以这种身份，普遍性被认为是普遍吸引力的特征，或者是道德要求具有约束力的一般方式。平等原则是以这种方式理解的普遍性的规范关联。普遍性也是判断的特征，其道德充分性通过普遍化程序得到验证。关于普遍性，德罗布尼茨基以道德主体的个人任务和阶级道德观点的普遍性的形式讨论了普遍道德要求的个体化等重要问题。他试图通过诉诸某些“历史的一般规律”来解释普遍性的这些不同的、并不总是相互关联的方面，从而提供了道德的历史主义基础。这篇文章表明，尽管对普遍性问题进行了史无前例的（对于苏联伦理文学而言）分析，但德罗布尼茨基并没有在他的普遍性概念化中得出系统的结论。尽管如此，他还是能够提供许多重要的见解，有可能帮助我们进一步理解普遍性现象以及应该如何理解它。