Analysts of “State Capture” too often treat the phenomenon as an outside-in process. They identify firms or rent-seeking political entrepreneurs that take over, subvert, or otherwise bend political structures to serve their parochial interests. The key to solving the perceived problem is supposed to lie in better governance, strengthened judicial systems, civic education, and transparency in political and civic activities. This essay will suggest this construct involves a misunderstanding of the relationship between patronage networks and supposedly “legitimate” legal and constitutional institutions enshrined in a teleology of Democracy and Rule-of-Law performances. Patronage politics in the Balkans produces pragmatic social management patterns, not just theft by greedy firms and selfish individuals. This argument builds on Charles Tilly’s observation of the inverse relationship between Democracy and trust to explain why externally imposed programs of civic education and political reform designed to free a state from its perceived capture fail to do much more than recruit a thin sliver of local civic activists, scold “captured” populations, and undermine the credibility of international overseers.

中文翻译：

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状态在它存在之前被捕获

“状态捕获”的分析人员往往将这种现象视为由外而内的过程。他们确定接管、颠覆或以其他方式扭曲政治结构以服务于其狭隘利益的公司或寻租政治企业家。解决感知问题的关键应该在于更好的治理、加强司法系统、公民教育以及政治和公民活动的透明度。本文将表明这种结构涉及对赞助网络与被奉为民主和法治表演目的论的所谓“合法”法律和宪法机构之间关系的误解。巴尔干地区的赞助政治产生了务实的社会管理模式，而不仅仅是贪婪的公司和自私的个人的盗窃行为。