Krishnachandra's re-articulation of Kant's transcendental system challenges Kant's conceptualization of 'apperceptive self' conceived as a logical function which is as well the precondition of all our knowledge claims. In Kant's framework, though this "unity of consciousness" is projected as a principle, which undertakes a foundational role as 'apperceptive I', it is capacitated with merely a logical function. Krishnachandra disagrees with Kant's reduction of function of the "self" to a logical process. This reduction would render knowledge of the "self" to be an inferential knowledge, thus making this derivation analogous to the proofs of the transcendental conditions of understanding and sensibility through the logical process of deductions. Krishnachandra's question is: whether this equation established between logical function of 'apperception' and the "self" will suffice to establish the "certitude" of knowledge claims. This is the first task Krishnachandra addresses in his work, Studies in Kant which is elucidated in the following section of this paper. Further, we will see how Krishnachandra’s exploration into the dynamics of this problem leads him to alternatively foreground the "unity", which is much sought by Kantian scholars, between the theoretical and the practical domains of Reason.

Krishnachandra 对康德先验系统的重新阐述挑战了康德关于“感知自我”的概念化，该概念被视为一种逻辑功能，它也是我们所有知识主张的前提。在康德的框架中，虽然这种“意识的统一”被投射为一个原则，它承担着“知觉的我”的基础作用，但它仅具有逻辑功能。Krishnachandra 不同意康德将“自我”的功能简化为一个逻辑过程。这种还原将使“自我”的知识成为一种推理知识，从而使这种推导类似于通过演绎的逻辑过程对理解和感性的先验条件的证明。克里希那昌德拉的问题是：在“统觉”的逻辑功能与“自我”之间建立的这个等式是否足以建立知识主张的“确定性”。这是克里希纳昌德拉在他的工作中提出的第一个任务，康德的研究将在本文的以下部分进行阐述。此外，我们将看到 Krishnachandra 对这个问题动力学的探索如何使他在理性的理论和实践领域之间交替地突出康德学者所寻求的“统一”。