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On the Will Not to Believe and Axiological Atheism: a Reply to Cockayne and Warman
Sophia ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2019-11-29 , DOI: 10.1007/s11841-019-00740-0
Kirk Lougheed

In a recent article in Sophia, Joshua Cockayne and Jack Warman (2019) defend a view they call supra-evidential atheistic fideism. This is the idea that considerations similar to William James’s defence of theistic belief can be used to justify atheistic belief. If an individual evaluates the evidence for atheism and theism as roughly the same (i.e. either can be epistemically rational), then she can rationally believe in atheism if her passions lean in that direction, provided the belief in atheism is forced, live and momentous. After outlining their defence of atheistic fideism, I offer some friendly amendments to their position. Cockayne and Warman claim that when the existential question of God’s existence is undecided for someone, she is rational to let her passions answer the existential question. This is a version of Rowe’s friendly atheism because it can explain the existence of religious disagreement, even in cases where an atheist and theist give the same assessment of the evidence for God’s (non)existence; they disagree at the passional level, not at the evidential level. I argue for a different version of friendly atheism: a mere passion need not settle the existential question about God when the evidence cannot decide it. For one might be rational in preferring that God not exist if God’s existence would make things worse. For certain individuals, this is reason enough to accept and act as if atheism is true, even if it is not epistemically rational to believe that it’s true.

中文翻译:

关于不相信的意志和价值论无神论:对科凯恩和沃曼的答复

在 Sophia 最近的一篇文章中,Joshua Cockayne 和 Jack Warman(2019 年)捍卫了一种他们称之为超证据无神论信仰主义的观点。这种观点认为,类似于威廉詹姆斯为有神论信仰辩护的考虑可以用来证明无神论信仰。如果一个人将无神论和有神论的证据评估为大致相同(即两者都可以是认识论上理性的),那么如果她的激情倾向于那个方向,那么她就可以理性地相信无神论,前提是对无神论的信仰是被迫的、生动的和重要的。在概述了他们对无神论信仰主义的辩护之后,我对他们的立场提出了一些友好的修正。Cockayne 和 Warman 声称,当上帝存在的存在问题对某人没有决定时,她是理性的,让她的激情回答存在问题。这是罗的友好无神论的一个版本,因为它可以解释宗教分歧的存在,即使在无神论者和有神论者对上帝(不)存在的证据给出相同评估的情况下;他们在激情层面上存在分歧,而不是在证据层面上。我主张一种不同版本的友好无神论:当证据无法决定时,单纯的激情不需要解决关于上帝的存在问题。因为如果上帝的存在会使事情变得更糟,那么人们可能更愿意上帝不存在是理性的。对于某些人来说,即使相信它是真的在认识论上并不理性,这也足以让他们接受并表现得好像无神论是真的。即使在无神论者和有神论者对上帝(不)存在的证据给出相同评估的情况下;他们在激情层面上存在分歧,而不是在证据层面上。我主张一种不同版本的友好无神论:当证据无法决定时,单纯的激情不需要解决关于上帝的存在问题。因为如果上帝的存在会使事情变得更糟,那么人们可能更愿意上帝不存在是理性的。对于某些人来说,即使相信它是真的在认识论上并不理性,这也足以让他们接受并表现得好像无神论是真的。即使在无神论者和有神论者对上帝(不)存在的证据给出相同评估的情况下;他们在激情层面上存在分歧,而不是在证据层面上。我主张一种不同版本的友好无神论:当证据无法决定时,单纯的激情不需要解决关于上帝的存在问题。因为如果上帝的存在会使事情变得更糟,那么人们可能更愿意上帝不存在是理性的。对于某些人来说,即使相信它是真的在认识论上并不理性,这也足以让他们接受并表现得好像无神论是真的。因为如果上帝的存在会使事情变得更糟,那么人们可能更愿意上帝不存在是理性的。对于某些人来说,即使相信它是真的在认识论上并不理性,这也足以让他们接受并表现得好像无神论是真的。因为如果上帝的存在会使事情变得更糟,那么人们可能更愿意上帝不存在是理性的。对于某些人来说,即使相信它是真的在认识论上并不理性,这也足以让他们接受并表现得好像无神论是真的。
更新日期:2019-11-29
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