This paper, which takes the form of a case study, aims to contribute to the debate on activities of the Islamic State’s unofficial media bureaus. Based on tools of open source intelligence, as well as a limited content analysis, it maps the online presence and activities of Ahlut-Tawhid Publications (AHP). Its means of distributing pro-Daesh content in the surface web as well as its general impact are discussed. It also deliberates on the interconnectedness of AHP with other online propaganda cells supporting the self-proclaimed “Caliphate.” This paper argues that this group was part of the ongoing online campaign of the Islamic State in the World Wide Web in 2018 and 2019. It maintained quite an impressive and long-lasting online presence, combining the potential of the most popular microblogs, hosting services and social media with the flexibility of standalone websites. In contrast to the most recognized propaganda cells of Daesh, such as al-Hayat Media Centre or Amaq News Agency whose productions have been quickly detected and removed from the mainstream webpages for years, AHP kept a low profile for the most part of 2018. In effect, it benefited from its relative anonymity and for months operated a network of pro-IS distribution channels throughout Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 environments. This ceased to be the case in 2019, when most of them were incapacitated (banned) by law enforcement or abandoned. It is clear that the attention given to proliferating propaganda through the surface web decreased at this time, probably in favor of the Telegram communication software, as the discovered statistics suggest. The only active (still updated) locations—partially related to Ahlut-Tawhid Publications—belonged to the Bengali Ansar network. It has to be stressed, however, that AHP failed to spark increased attention of Internet users.

中文翻译：

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绘制伊斯兰国非官方宣传小组的在线存在和活动：Ahlut-Tawhid Publications

本文采用案例研究的形式，旨在为有关“伊斯兰国”非官方媒体机构活动的辩论做出贡献。基于开源情报工具以及有限的内容分析，它映射了 Ahlut-Tawhid Publications (AHP) 的在线状态和活动。讨论了它在表面网络中分发亲达伊沙内容的方法及其一般影响。它还讨论了 AHP 与其他支持自称为“哈里发国”的在线宣传单元的相互关联性。本文认为，该组织是 2018 年和 2019 年伊斯兰国在万维网上正在进行的在线活动的一部分。它结合了最受欢迎的微博的潜力，保持了令人印象深刻且持久的在线形象，具有独立网站灵活性的托管服务和社交媒体。与伊斯兰国最受认可的宣传机构（例如 al-Hayat Media Center 或 Amaq News Agency 的作品多年来迅速被发现并从主流网页中删除）相比，AHP 在 2018 年的大部分时间里都保持低调。结果，它受益于其相对匿名性，并在整个 Web 1.0 和 Web 2.0 环境中运营了一个亲 IS 分销渠道网络数月。这种情况在 2019 年不再是这样，当时他们中的大多数都被执法部门剥夺了行为能力（禁止）或被遗弃。很明显，此时对通过地表网络扩散宣传的关注减少了，可能有利于 Telegram 通信软件，正如发现的统计数据所表明的那样。唯一活跃（仍在更新）的位置——部分与 Ahlut-Tawhid Publications 相关——属于孟加拉语 Ansar 网络。然而，必须强调的是，层次分析法未能引起互联网用户越来越多的关注。