The theory of we-mode cognition seeks to expand our understanding of the cognition involved in joint action, and therein claims to explain how we can have non-theoretical and non-simulative access to the minds of others (Gallotti and Frith Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17: 160-165, 2013a, Gallotti and Frith Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17: 304-305, 2013b). A basic tenet of this theory is that each individual jointly intends to accomplish some outcome together, requiring the adoption of a “first-person plural perspective” (Gallotti and Frith 2013a, p.160) that is neither strictly individualistic – in the sense that a we-mode state is enabled by the joint involvement of (an)other(s) – nor strictly pluralistic – in the sense that the involved individuals, rather than a ‘group’, are the bearers of the relevant joint intention(s). Whilst I concur with the idea that, in certain circumstances, we cognise from an irreducible ‘first-person plural perspective’, Gallotti & Frith’s existing proposal of we-mode cognition is in need of theoretical clarification. In this paper, I deliver such clarification so that the theory of we-mode cognition is re-defined as: (a). sensitive to the phenomenological transformation that is induced by the embodied co-presence of others, and (b). limited to cases in which one intentionally attends to the capacities of one’s co-participant in joint action.

我们模式认知的理论试图扩大我们对联合行动所涉及的认知的理解，并在其中声称解释了我们如何能够以非理论和非模拟的方式进入他人的思想（Gallotti 和 Frith Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 17: 160-165, 2013a, Gallotti and Frith Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17: 304-305, 2013b)。这一理论的一个基本原则是，每个人共同打算完成一些成果在一起，要求采用“第一人称复数视角”（Gallotti and Frith 2013a, p.160），这既不是严格的个人主义——在某种意义上说，我们模式状态是通过（一个）其他人的共同参与实现的（ s) – 也不是严格意义上的多元化 – 从某种意义上说，所涉及的个人，而不是“群体”，是相关共同意图的承担者。虽然我同意在某些情况下我们从不可简化的“第一人称复数视角”进​​行认知的观点，但 Gallotti 和 Frith 现有的我们模式认知提议需要理论澄清。在本文中，我提供了这样的澄清，以便我们模式认知的理论被重新定义为：（a）。对由具身共存引起的现​​象学转变敏感其他人，以及（b）。仅限于在联合行动中有意关注其共同参与者的能力的情况。