In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories.

在过去的几十年中，关于情感类别的科学地位一直存在着很大的争议。引起争议的原因是情感是异质现象，因此无法将其归类为一种共同的现象。在本文中，我分析了这一主张（我称之为可变性论点），并指出，就目前情况而言，它的定义存在问题。为了证明这一点，我研究了Scarantino（2015）提出的最新论文。一方面，我提出了有关索赔逻辑结构的一些问题。另一方面，最重要的是，我表明变异性论文需要就在不同领域中什么是相关的响应模式达成共识，这是当前文献中缺乏的共识。这使得很难评估哪些证据可以支持或反对本论文。结果，基于可变论的论点是不必要的。这引起了人们对当前情绪的一些经验理论的严重关注，但也阐明了情绪类别的科学地位问题。