Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully-fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action-demonstrative’ representation, I show that the sceptic’s arguments do not go through. Anscombe; intentional action; know-how; non-observational knowledge; practical knowledge; skill

中文翻译：

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知道你在做什么：不反省的行动中的行动示范

我们所做的几乎所有事情都是通过做其他事情来完成的。即使我们没有深思熟虑或有意识地计划的行动也是由“较小的”辅助行动组成的。但是我们应该如何看待这样的附属行为呢？它们本身是否是完全成熟的有意行为（就我们出于某种原因所做的事情而言）？在本文中，我捍卫对这个问题的肯定答案，反对最近有影响力的怀疑主义形式。我利用一种独特的“行动示范”表示法，表明怀疑论者的论点没有通过。安斯科姆；有意的行动；知识; 非观察性知识；实践知识; 技能