Constitutions enshrine the fundamental values of a people and they build a framework for a state’s public policy. With regard to generational change, their endurance gives rise to two interlinked concerns: the sovereignty concern and the forgone welfare concern. If constitutions are intergenerational contracts, how (in)flexible should they be? This article discusses perpetual constitutions, sunset constitutions, constitutional reform commissions and constitutional conventions, both historically and analytically. It arrives at the conclusion that very rigid constitutions are incompatible with the principle of intergenerational justice. Recurring constitutional reform commissions in fixed time intervals would give each generation of citizens a say without leaning too much to the side of flexibility.

中文翻译：

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谁的宪法？宪法自决与世代相传

宪法体现了人民的基本价值观，并为国家的公共政策建立了框架。关于世代改变，他们的忍耐力引起两个相互关联的关注：主权关注和放弃的福利关注。如果宪法是代际契约，那么宪法应该（不）灵活吗？本文从历史和分析角度讨论了永久宪法，日落宪法，宪法改革委员会和宪法公约。得出的结论是，非常僵化的宪法与代际正义原则不符。以固定的时间间隔定期进行的宪法改革委员会将使每一代公民都有发言权，而又不会过于依赖灵活性。