Legal formalism is the foil for many theories of law. Yet formalism remains controversial, meaning that its critics focus on claims that are not central. This paper sets out a view of formalism using a methodology that embraces one of formalism’s most distinct claims, that formalism is a scientific theory of law. This naturalistic view of formalism helps to distinguish two distinct types of formalism, “doctrinal formalism,” the view that judicial behaviour can be represented using rules, and “rule formalism,” the view that judges follow external rules when they are deciding cases. Doctrinal formalism, understood in naturalistic terms, overcomes many of the criticisms that have been levelled at formalism and can also be used to rehabilitate the currently out‐of‐favour “declaratory theory of law.” Doctrinal formalism is also a longstanding view of law, reflecting both what the original formalists thought of law, and what many present‐day doctrinal lawyers seem to believe. The naturalistic methodology is used to show that the main dispute between doctrinal formalism and American legal realism can be explained by a difference of assumptions concerning whether the values of judges are relative to society, or relative to other judges.

中文翻译：

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为什么法律形式主义不是愚蠢的事情

法律形式主义是许多法律理论的障碍。但是形式主义仍然存在争议，这意味着形式主义的批评者关注的不是核心的主张。本文使用一种包含形式主义最独特主张的方法论来提出形式主义观点，即形式主义是法律的科学理论。这种形式主义的自然主义观点有助于区分两种形式的形式主义，即“教义形式主义”，可以用规则表示司法行为的观点和“规则形式主义”，即法官在决定案件时遵循外部规则的观点。以自然主义的术语理解的教条形式主义克服了许多对形式主义提出的批评，也可以用来恢复目前不受欢迎的“声明式法律理论”。教条形式主义也是法律的长期观点，既反映了原始形式主义者对法律的看法，也反映了当今许多教条律师似乎​​相信的东西。用自然主义的方法论来证明，教条形式主义与美国法律现实主义之间的主要争议可以用关于法官的价值观是相对于社会还是相对于其他法官的假设的不同来解释。