Decision theorists have attempted to accommodate several violations of decision theory’s axiomatic requirements by modifying how agents’ choice options are individuated and formally represented. In recent years, prominent authors have worried that these modifications threaten to trivialize decision theory, make the theory unfalsifiable, impose overdemanding requirements on decision theorists, and hamper decision theory’s internal coherence. In this paper, I draw on leading descriptive and normative works in contemporary decision theory to address these prominent concerns. In doing so, I articulate and assess several different criteria for individuating and formally representing agents’ choice options.

决策理论家试图通过修改个体的选择选项的个性化和形式表示方式来适应决策理论的公理要求的若干违反。近年来，著名的作者担心这些修改可能威胁到决策理论的琐碎，使该理论无法被伪造，对决策理论家施加了过高的要求，并妨碍了决策理论的内部连贯性。在本文中，我将利用当代决策理论中的主要描述性和规范性著作来解决这些突出的问题。在此过程中，我阐述并评估了几种不同的标准，以区分和正式代表代理商的选择方案。