I share with all the other authors the view that conceptual metaphysics without close ties to science is of minimal value, that this holds for much of current work on social ontology, and that if there is value in social ontology, it has to be in contributing to empirical social science. I do perhaps disagree with all three authors about making any blanket statements concerning either instrumentalism or realism about the social sciences and their ontologies. I argue and try to show instead that if there are fruitful questions of social ontology, they are probably mostly local empirical issues raised by specific pieces of social science. Certain kinds of pluralism and instrumentalism may well make sense in some situations. I illustrate with debates over the need for psychological realism and revealed preference theory in economics.

中文翻译：

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具体的本体论：评论劳尔，利特和洛斯

我与所有其他作者一样认为，与科学没有紧密联系的概念形而上学具有极小的价值，这对于当前有关社会本体论的许多工作都具有价值，并且，如果社会本体论具有价值，那么它就必须做出贡献。对经验社会科学。对于所有关于社会科学及其本体论的工具主义或现实主义的概括性陈述，我可能都不同意所有三位作者。我争辩并试图表明，如果存在社会本体论方面的卓有成效的问题，它们可能主要是社会科学的特定部分提出的局部经验问题。在某些情况下，某些类型的多元化和工具主义可能很有意义。我通过辩论来说明对心理现实主义的需求，并揭示了经济学中的偏好理论。