Are institutional principles of justice subject to a minimal realism constraint to the effect that, to be valid, they must not make demands that are wildly unrealistic in the sense that there is no chance (or a vanishingly small chance) that they will ever be met because we are robustly disposed to fail to set out to do some of the things that meeting the demands would require? Many of us say “yes.” David Estlund says “no.” However, while Estlund holds that 1) institutional principles of justice are not subject to a minimal realism constraint, he accepts that 2) institutional principles of justice are subject to an attainability constraint to the effect that, to be valid, they must not make demands we are unable to meet; and 3) what he calls “institutional proposals” are subject to a minimal realism constraint. I argue that these three theses do not represent a plausible combination given Estlund’s account of the principle/proposal distinction. Given this account, Estlund is either wrong to reject a minimal realism constraint on institutional principles of justice, or wrong to accept an attainability constraint on institutional principles of justice and/or a minimal realism constraint on institutional proposals.

中文翻译：

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极端不切实际的正义的可能性和原则/提案的区别

正义的制度原则是否受到最低限度的现实主义约束，其结果是，为了有效，它们不得提出极不现实的要求，即没有机会（或几乎没有机会）满足这些要求？因为我们坚决不会着手去做一些满足要求所需的事情？我们中的许多人说“是的”。大卫·埃斯特伦德说“不”。然而，虽然埃斯特伦德认为 1) 制度正义原则不受最小现实主义约束，但他接受 2) 制度正义原则受可达到性约束的影响，即，为了有效，它们不得提出要求我们无法见面；3）他所谓的“制度建议”受到最低限度的现实主义约束。我认为，鉴于 Estlund 对原则/建议区别的解释，这三个论点并不代表一个合理的组合。鉴于这一解释，埃斯特伦德要么拒绝对正义的制度原则的最小现实主义约束，要么错误地接受对制度正义原则的可达到性约束和/或对制度建议的最小现实主义约束。