According to the Matching Thesis (MT), the temporal structure of experience in time matches the apparent temporal structure of the objects and events represented in the content of perceptual experience. In this paper I critically address attempts to show the MT on the grounds that perceptual experience is transparent: that experiences themselves possess no introspectively discernible temporal structure apart from that of the apparent objects perceived. Pace such a Transparency Argument for the MT, I argue that considerations of perceptual transparency can in fact ground no view about the relationship between the temporal structure of perceptual experiences and the apparent temporal structure of objects and events that experience represents. I defend this outcome against a line of objection having to do with self-knowledge.

中文翻译：

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知觉透明度和经验的时间结构

根据匹配论（MT），时间中的经验时间结构与感知经验内容中所代表的对象和事件的表观时间结构相匹配。在这篇论文中，我批判性地阐述了基于感知体验是透明的展示 MT 的尝试：除了感知到的明显对象之外，体验本身不具有内省可辨别的时间结构。为 MT 提出这样一个透明的论点，我认为，对感知透明度的考虑实际上不能构成关于感知体验的时间结构与体验所代表的对象和事件的表观时间结构之间关系的观点。我为这个结果辩护，反对与自我认识有关的反对意见。