Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory.

中文翻译：

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理性一元论与理性多元论

结果论者通常假设理性一元论：通过最大化相同数量，选择总是被理性地允许的论点。本文认为，结果论者应该拒绝理性一元论，而应接受理性多元论：在不同情况下，通过最大化不同数量来合理地允许选择的论点。然后，本文发展了一种理性多元主义的系统形式，与其竞争对手不同，它能够处理挑战证据决策理论的纽科姆问题和挑战因果决策理论的不稳定问题。