The coherence of omniscience is sometimes challenged using self-referential sentences like, “No omniscient entity knows that which this very sentence expresses,” which suggest that there are truths which no omniscient entity knows. In this paper, I consider two strategies for addressing these challenges: The Common Strategy, which dismisses such self-referential sentences as meaningless, and The Conciliatory Strategy, which discounts them as quirky outliers with no impact on one’s status as being omniscient. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. The Common Strategy fails because it is both unmotivated and impotent. The Conciliatory Strategy fails because it leads to embarrassing situations in which omniscient entities are epistemically inferior to non-omniscient entities: we can, for example, devise trivia-based drinking games that force omniscient entities into an intoxicated state; and, given plausible closure principles for belief, such entities are unable to have the sorts of beliefs that give them reason to refuse to play (e.g., they are unable to believe that they can lose the game).

中文翻译：

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和解全知的醉人作用

无所不知的连贯性有时会受到诸如“没有无所不知的实体知道这句话所表达的内容”之类的自指句子的挑战，这表明存在无所不知的实体不知道的真理。在本文中，我考虑了两种应对这些挑战的策略：共同策略，将这种自我参照的句子视为毫无意义，以及调解策略，将它们视为古怪的异常值，对一个人的无所不知的状态没有影响。我认为这两种策略都不会成功。共同战略之所以失败，是因为它既没有动力又无能为力。和解策略失败是因为它导致尴尬的情况，在这种情况下，全知实体在认知上不如非全知实体：例如，我们可以，设计基于琐事的饮酒游戏，迫使无所不知的实体进入陶醉状态；并且，给定可信的关闭原则，这些实体无法拥有让他们有理由拒绝玩游戏的那种信念（例如，他们无法相信他们会输掉游戏）。